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ORGANIZING RISK:  
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT THEORY FOR THE RISK SOCIETY 
 
Abstract 
Risk has become a crucial part of organizing, affecting a wide range of organizations in all sectors. 
We identify, review and integrate diverse literatures relevant to organizing risk, building on an 
existing framework that describes how risk is organized in three ‘modes’ – prospectively, in real-
time, and retrospectively. We then identify three critical issues in the existing literature: its 
fragmented nature; its neglect of the tensions associated with each of the modes; and its tendency to 
assume that the meaning of an object in relation to risk is singular and stable. We provide a series of 
new insights with regard to each of these issues. First, we develop the concept of a risk cycle that 
shows how organizations engage with all three modes and transition between them over time. 
Second, we explain why the tensions have been largely ignored and show how studies using a risk 
work perspective can provide further insights into them. Third, we develop the concept of risk 
translation to highlight the ways in the meanings of risks can be transformed and to identify the 
political consequences of such translations. We conclude the paper with a research agenda to 








INTRODUCTION: THE ORGANIZING OF RISK 
If a reminder was needed, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown yet again, that risk is a 
prominent feature of contemporary organizing: organizations bear risks, their activities produce 
risks, and they are increasingly regulated by other organizations in attempts to avoid or contain 
risks (Czarniawska, 2009; Power, 2007; Scheytt et al., 2006). The concept of risk has become a 
powerful organizing logic (Power, 2004) as organizations have become “centres for processing and 
handling risk” (Hutter & Power, 2005: 1). We now live in a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992) that is 
increasingly preoccupied with “debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has produced” 
(Beck, 2006: 332). Accordingly, organizations are as concerned with producing and bearing risks as 
they are with wealth creation (Tsoukas, 1999). It is, therefore, important that, as organizational 
scholars, we understand the ways in which risk and organizing are tightly bound up with each other.  
The concept of risk has a long history, but its rise is strongly associated with early 
modernity (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999a, 1999b), when science and rationality, rather than religion, 
were brought to bear on intellectual and philosophical thought. The “mastery of risk” put paid to the 
notion that the future was merely “a whim of the gods” (Bernstein, 1996: 1). Risks could be ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ (Lupton, 2013a; O’Malley, 2004). For example, with its early use in marine insurance, risk 
was associated with the chances of a ship returning safely and making its owner’s fortune against 
the chances of it being lost at sea and bringing ruin (Douglas, 1992). By understanding the risks, 
organizations could decide the best action to take in order to exploit them, avoid them or insure 
against them. While it was desirable to avoid adverse outcomes when possible, it was often worth 
risking them in order to secure the associated rewards and returns (e.g., Jarzabkowski, Bednarek & 
Spee, 2015; Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons, 2001). Accordingly, many organizations engaged in risk-
taking to obtain higher financial or entrepreneurial gains (Lupton, 2013a; McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006). “By showing the world how to understand risk, measure it, and weigh its consequences … 
risk-taking [was turned] into one of the prime catalysts that drives modern Western society” 




Over time, the concept of risk travelled and expanded from economic and financial spheres 
to permeate other domains (Power, 2014), such as medicine, engineering, environmental studies, 
health and safety, and psychology (Scott & Walsham, 2005). In doing so, it became associated with 
more negative connotations. Instead of a focus on organizations which took risks and managed 
them (more or less) to their advantage, attention turned to organizations which produced risks borne 
by others – especially global, manufactured risks created by the “progression of human 
development” (Giddens, 1999b: 4). As a result, risk came to be seen as: “a threat, hazard, danger or 
some form of harm” (Gephart,Van Maanen & Oberlechner, 2009: 141), “the possibility of an 
unfortunate occurrence” (Society for Risk Analysis, 2018), the “anticipation of catastrophe” (Beck, 
2006: 332), a “situation in which something of value (human well-being, property, or morals or 
beliefs) is threatened” (Beamish, 2019: 88), or “the chance of mishap” (Cranor, 2007: 38).  
Whether associated with financial gain or some form of catastrophe, organizations sought to 
calculate risks – typically in statistical terms as the probability of an event multiplied by the 
magnitude of losses or gains associated with the event – so that appropriate actions could be taken. 
The aim of calculating risks was, then, to ascertain exactly what they were, how likely they were to 
arise, and what their effects would be if they did. The calculation of risk, as a result, became ever 
more ‘scientized’ with the proliferation of techniques and methodologies to assess and manage risk 
(Power, 2004). It is these techniques that differentiated risk from uncertainty: in the former, the 
probability of an event occurring is known; in the latter, it cannot be specified, making it far more 
difficult for organizations to take decisions to deal with it (Knight, 1921).  
This clear distinction between risk and uncertainty no longer holds true – the concept of risk 
has changed “from one of probability to one of radical uncertainty” (Willms & Beck, 2004: 31; see 
also King & Kay, 2020).The global, manufactured risks produced in contemporary society are not 
only associated with negative outcomes, they are also novel, unfamiliar and involve considerable 
uncertainty “We often don’t really know what the risks are, let alone how to calculate them 




causalities, global impacts, long lead times and catastrophic consequences (e.g., Arnoldi, 2009; 
Aven & Renn, 2009; Beck, 2006; Hardy & Maguire, 2019; Mazri, 2017), these risks are not 
amenable to current scientific techniques (Vlek, 2010). In fact, instead of science creating certainty 
as was once “triumphantly presumed,” it now “generates even more uncertainty” (Tsoukas, 1999: 
505). Seemingly simple questions as to whether a risk exists or not cannot easily be answered 
(Borraz, Gilbert & Joly, 2007; van Asselt & Vos, 2008). Accordingly, we define risk as “a 
phenomenon that has the potential to deliver substantial harm, whether or not the probability of this 
harm eventuating is estimable” (Lupton, 2013a: 10). 
The confidence that the concept of risk once engendered through its ability to render 
uncertain, potentially hazardous futures into ‘knowable’ risks (Elliott, 2002; Binkley, 2009) has 
broken down, with the result that risks are “less readily identifiable, more problematic, less easily 
managed, and more anxiety-provoking” (Gephart, et al., 2009: 142). Accordingly, organizations are 
increasingly preoccupied with risks but, paradoxically, less able to manage them (Holt, 2004; 
Tsoukas, 1999). “The irony of risk here is that rationality, that is, the experience of the past, 
encourages anticipation of the wrong kind of risk, the one we believe we can calculate and control, 
whereas the disaster arises from what we do not know and cannot calculate” (Beck, 2006: 330). In 
studying risk, then, we can no longer limit ourselves to the study of the techniques used to calculate 
risks. Instead, we must examine how risk is organized (e.g., Hardy & Maguire, 2016; Power, 2004; 
Short & Clarke, 1992), by which we refer to the systems created, the procedures employed, and the 
accountability relationships that are enacted in and among organizations in order to deal with 
phenomena that are considered to have the potential to deliver substantial harm. As we will show in 
this article, organizing risk involves far more than calculating them before they arise; it also means 
containing risks that do arise and reflecting on how to improve how they are organized in the future.   
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain how we identified the 
literature for our review. We then present our literature review in two parts. In the first, we focus on 




identify three different ‘modes’ through which risk is organized – prospective, real-time and 
retrospective – which we characterize as a risk cycle. In each mode, we identify a potential tension 
between two sets of practices, whose implications we later explore. The second part of the literature 
review presents three important perspectives that researchers use when they examine risk from an 
organizational standpoint – risk culture, risk work and risk translation. We show how the three 
perspectives potentially cut across the three modes of organizing risk and, as such, provide an 
important resource for our subsequent insights. From this review of the literature, we identify three 
critical issues. The first concerns the tendency of the risk literature to focus on a single mode even 
though situations may require organizations to engage with multiple modes. Accordingly, we 
present a series of new insights into the concept of a risk cycle and discuss how organizations 
transition from one mode to another. The second critical issue concerns the tensions that 
characterize each of the three modes – although the existing literature acknowledges that such 
tensions exist, it offers little understanding of how organizations deal with them. Accordingly, we 
explore how the risk-culture and risk-work perspectives shed light on these tensions and stress the 
benefits from adopting risk work as an analytical framework for inquiry. The third critical issue 
concerns how risk translations not only change the meaning of objects in relation to risk, but also 
transform power relations among actors. Accordingly, we present a series of new insights to help 
researchers understand the way in which organizing risk is situated in a larger socio-political 
context. We conclude the article by offering suggestions for future research.  
METHODOLOGY 
Literature reviews vary significantly in terms of how they are carried out and what they are 
intended to achieve (Cooper, 1988). Our purpose is to review literature relevant to organizing risk 
in order to develop insights and suggest promising research directions that will increase the 
relevance of organization and management theory (OMT) to the contemporary risk society. 




representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives 
on the topic are generated” (Torraco, 2016: 404). Such reviews are conducted critically and 
organized thematically with a view to reconceptualizing existing ideas and providing a catalyst for 
future research (Snyder, 2019). For a somewhat similar approach, see Amis, Mair & Munir (2020). 
Two notable features of our literature review are, therefore, the following.  
First, our integrative review sought to elaborate and enhance a framework developed in 
earlier work (Hardy & Maguire, 2016). Accordingly, as we were reading the material, we were also 
synthesizing themes and identifying particular issues related to this framework that we wanted to 
pursue. We therefore conducted selective, purposeful searching (Grant & Booth, 2009) in order to 
track down particular publications that promised to add to our understanding by filling in gaps 
and/or contributing ideas for interesting new avenues of research. Second, ‘organizing risk’ is not a 
concept that lends itself to comprehensive database searches. It is not a common search term and 
relevant articles appear in a wide range of specialist journals outside OMT. These articles are 
difficult to identify through systematic searches, especially given the large number of highly 
technical articles that are not relevant, but which result from searches using ‘risk’ together with 
organizational search terms.  
Recognizing that organizations are increasingly preoccupied with risks that are not 
necessarily amenable to calculation and being aware that the majority of the literature on risk is 
highly technical, our objective is to provide insight into how risks are organized. We therefore 
started with a comprehensive database search to identify articles with ‘risk’ in nine leading OMT 
journals – Academy of Management Annals, Academy of Management Review, Academy of 
Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management Studies, 
Organization, Organization Science, Organization Studies, and Strategic Management Journal for 
the last twenty years. Three reasons underlie the selection of the journals chosen: they are held in 
high esteem in relevant journal rankings (Laing et al., 2015); they have been used in other Annals 




yielded returned 120 articles. However, the vast majority had to be excluded because they did not 
address the organizing of risk but, instead, covered a range of technical topics such as risk 
tolerance, risk preferences, risk-taking, risk-return relationships, risk-return paradox, political risk, 
acquisition risk, climate risk, and so forth. While the remaining 18 articles proved helpful, it was 
clear to us that numbers were insufficient to achieve our objective. 
We therefore decided to target research in other journals that might also inform the three 
modes for organizing risk identified in Hardy and Maguire’s (2016) framework, although this 
search proved equally unproductive. For example, in relation to the prospective mode, we searched 
for articles on ‘risk and ‘organization’ or ‘organizational’ in their titles and published in leading risk 
journals – Risk Analysis and Risk Management yielded 33 hits, but a review of abstracts revealed 
that the vast majority of these articles were highly technical, as a result of which 32 were discarded 
because they provided no insight into organizing risk. A similar search of Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management and Disaster Prevention and Management to identify material relevant to 
the real-time mode proved equally fruitless – we identified 76 articles, which we discarded as not 
being relevant. Finally, a search of Safety Science and Journal of Safety Research to identify papers 
related to the retrospective mode and addressing organizational reviews resulted in 57 hits but, 
again, we discarded them all because they did not directly address the organizing of risk.  
Given the limited success of these database searches, we decided to employ a more 
selective, purposive search. An evolving search strategy is often required with integrative reviews 
in order to follow up various leads and shifts in thinking (Bates, 1989). Consequently, we employed 
what is known as forward and backward ‘chaining’ i.e., following up on promising references found 
in the bibliographies of material identified through comprehensive searching, as well as following 
citations forward to other work that cited it (Ellis, 1989). In this way, we were able to identify work 
that looked promising in terms of adding to our understanding of how risk is organized. This 
targeted searching alerted us to valuable material in diverse journals, books and chapters that would 




review. Through this combination of searches, we identified the articles, books and chapters listed 
in Table A in the Appendix which form the basis our review of the three modes of organizing risk.  
As a result of our searching, it became increasingly clear – as we had suspected – that much 
of the material tended to be siloed, dealing with only a single mode (cf. Amis et al., 2020). This led 
us to develop a second objective: to provide a holistic understanding of how risk is organized in 
order to provide a firmer basis for new insights and future research. Accordingly, we conducted a 
second search phase – to identify work that had the potential to cut across more than one mode. 
Three particular perspectives appeared to offer the most promise: studies of risk culture, high 
reliability/resilient organizations, risk translation. We conducted standardized searches of these 
terms in the nine OMT journals, which identified few papers for our purposes. We therefore 
followed up on specific references and customized searches to identify the articles, books and book 
chapters listed in Table B in the Appendix. 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON ORGANIZING RISK 
The study of risk does not constitute a “tightly unified and consensual field but instead 
consists of many distinct subdisciplines and specialisms, rather like the islands of an archipelago” 
(Hood & Jones, 1996: 3). As a result, there is a considerable amount of research that does not 
always engage explicitly with the terminology of risk but, nonetheless, can contribute greatly to our 
understanding of how it is organized (Hardy & Maguire, 2016; Power, 2014). We present our 
review of the literature in two parts – on different modes and on different perspectives.  
Modes for Organizing Risk  
In this section, we review different bodies of research which suggest that risk is organized in 
three modes – prospectively, in real-time and retrospectively.  
Organizing Risks Prospectively  
The prospective mode for organizing risk refers to how organizations identify risks that may 




formal risk analysis where scientific techniques are used to identify and measure risks so that 
organizations can manage them. However, in order to understand how particular risks are singled 
out for some kind of intervention, whereas others are not, we must also consider the work on risk 
perception and risk controversies. We also discuss research on the discourse of risk, which provides 
an alternative approach by showing how risks are identified through processes of social 
construction. Finally, we identify an important tension between two sets of practices used to 
organize risk prospectively.  
The scientific discipline of risk analysis is a community of practice (Whittaker, 2015) with 
its own professional association (the Society for Risk Analysis), specialized journals, and thousands 
of scientists from different disciplines working to create standardized approaches to identify and 
manage risk. Originally driven by regulatory organizations (Demortain, 2020), it has since been 
taken up by organizations in a wide range of sectors to “evaluate process, product, or site 
remediation safety, prioritize risk reduction measures, or demonstrate regulatory compliance (or 
lack thereof)” (Whittaker, 2015: 2131). It operates on the basis that risk is an objective phenomenon 
which, having been identified, can be represented in quantitative terms and then managed. In this 
way, risk is ‘normalized’ i.e., by being measured and predicted through the application of normal 
science, and then limited to tolerable levels such that risk becomes accepted and taken-for-granted 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2013). 
Risk analysis comprises three interrelated components: risk assessment; risk management 
and risk communication (Fjeld, Eisenberg & Compton, 2007). Risk assessment is a systematic, 
quantitative process for identifying “risk sources, threats, hazards and opportunities” and 
determining their significance “using relevant criteria” (Society for Risk Analysis, 2018: 4). It 
provides a rational, formal basis for calculating exposure to risk when organizations are faced with 
the possibility of adverse events in the future. It conceptualizes exposure in probabilistic terms, 
drawing on actuarial science, statistics and hypothesis testing, as well as computer models for 




‘mathematizing’ of risk (MacKenzie, 2005; Mikes, 2009; 2011) is undertaken with an objective of 
maximizing financial gains for a given level of risk (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009). In this case, the 
risk bearer is also the beneficiary, as with an investor who bears the risk should asset prices fall and 
reaps the rewards if they rise. In other settings, the organization may benefit economically from 
producing risks, while individuals – employees, consumers and members of the community – bear 
them. In this case, risk regulators typically intervene – engaging in risk analysis in order to identify 
the risk and decide on appropriate ways to manage it (Fjeld et al., 2007).  
Risk management follows once the risk has been assessed. It is concerned with “exploring 
opportunities on the one hand, and avoiding losses, accidents and disasters on the other” in order to 
achieve “the proper risk level” (Society for Risk Analysis, 2018: 5). Whereas risk assessment is 
portrayed as the objective, scientific and fact-based component of risk analysis, risk management 
involves the use of value judgments. In simple terms, risk assessors ask: ‘how risky is this 
situation?’ Risk managers then ask: ‘how much risk are we willing to accept?’ and ‘what shall we 
do about it?’ (van Leeuwen & Vermeire, 2007). Risk management thus involves weighing 
alternative courses of action and selecting the most appropriate one by balancing the risk with 
“social, economic, and political concerns” (NAS–NRC, 1983: 18) or with the risk ‘tolerance’ or 
‘appetite’ of the organization (Bromiley et al., 2015; Power, 2009). For example, the United 
Nations Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants banned the use of a range of toxic chemicals 
but only restricted the use of the insecticide DDT because its benefits in reducing risks to human 
health (by combatting malaria) were considered to outweigh the risks it posed to the environment 
(Hardy & Maguire, 2010). 
Risk communication is carried out to ensure that “important issues are identified for analysis 
and to facilitate stakeholder understanding of the risk management decisions” (Fjeld et al., 2007: 3). 
It helps regulators and organizations involve stakeholders in identifying, preventing and managing 
risks (Leiss, 1996), as in major infrastructure developments posing health and/or environmental 




used to persuade stakeholders to modify their attitudes or behaviour to avoid risks or manage them 
differently, as with campaigns on the risks of smoking or drink-driving (Lundgren & McMakin, 
2018). Risk communication is often informed by research on risk perception, which tries to explain 
why individuals have different perceptions of the likelihood and magnitude of a specific risk 
(Slovic 2016) and, particularly, why ‘laypeople’ have the ‘wrong’ perception (Jasanoff, 1998). 
Accordingly, this literature tends to contrast “the objective facts identified by experts with 
subjective understandings of lay people who are subject to bias” (Gephart et al., 2009: 143). For 
example, risks whose hazards are difficult to observe, as with risks from exposure to chemicals in 
everyday consumer products, are often understated, whereas ‘dread’ risks, such as the risk of 
aircraft crashes, tend to be overstated (Jagiello & Hills, 2018). Another area of interest in this 
literature has been the denial of risk as a psychological process (e.g., Sjöberg, 2006).  
Another body of research that examines how risks are identified and acted upon focuses on 
risk controversies, where stakeholders have conflicting views of the risk and the values deemed to 
be ‘at risk’ (Boholm & Corvellec, 2011; Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011). The causes of such 
controversies are manifold. Experts may disagree due to difficulties in quantifying the risk or 
because ambiguous data leads to divergent interpretations (Borraz, 2007; van Asselt & Vos, 2008). 
Even if technical experts produce convergent assessments, the public may disagree with them 
(Beamish, 2001; Leiss, 2001). Accordingly, this literature highlights the difficulties of assessing 
risks whose “very definition is the subject of debates,” and which “lend themselves to phenomena 
of publicization and politicization” (Borraz, Gilbert & Joly, 2007: 989). Accordingly, there are 
studies of struggles among different groups over risks as diverse as those associated with the use of 
coal-fired power generating stations, the location of hazardous waste facilities and the development 
of salmon aquaculture (Jardine, Predy & Mackenzie, 2007; Renn & Schweizer, 2009; Young & 
Liston, 2010).  
The literature above tends to take a realist approach (Jasanoff, 1998; Zinn, 2008) where a 




magnitude or implications. The realist approach assumes that the existence of a risk “can be 
determined, accurately and objectively, through the application of scientific knowledge derived 
from the past in highly institutionalized ways, such as the employment of scientific measurement 
and analytical reasoning, and the application of specific, widely accepted risk analysis and 
measurement techniques” (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 84). Risks are seen as objective features of 
reality that can be ascertained through analysis, on the basis of which organizations decide whether 
and how to act on particular objects in order to avoid or reduce unwanted, adverse consequences.  
An alternative approach, informed by work in sociology, examines how risks are 
‘constructed’, (e.g., Beck, 2006; Clarke & Short, 1993; Douglas, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Lupton, 2013a; Power, 2004; 2007). This body of work focuses on how meanings in relation 
to risk are attached to particular objects through organizing processes (Maguire & Hardy, 2013). In 
other words, not everything that could be seen as a risk becomes recognized and represented as one 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Only certain entities, activities and individuals are constructed as 
‘risk objects,’ which occurs through a rhetorical process that identifies “an object deemed to ‘pose’ 
the risk, a putative harm, and a linkage alleging some form of causation between the object and the 
harm” (Hilgartner, 1992: 40). Accordingly, risks are constructed through “processes of negotiation 
and conflict resolution in settings ranging from the relatively closed quarters of a research 
laboratory to the public debate of a regulatory hearing” (Jasanoff, 1998: 94), as well as through 
“complex and necessarily incomplete processes of organizational attention involving information 
systems, incentive structures and narratives of explanation” (Scheytt et al., 2006: 1333). 
Accordingly, research has examined processes of constructing risks (e.g. Palermo, Power & Ashby, 
2017; Malenfant, 2009; Wissman-Weber & Levy, 2018; Nyberg & Wright, 2017), as well as the 
role played by narratives therein (e.g., Corvellec, 2011; Mairal, 2008). 
Some studies take an explicitly discursive approach (see Phillips & Oswick, 2012) by 
drawing on the work of Foucault (1980; 1991) to examine how these meanings are created and 




Hardy, 2013). A discourse is “a bounded body of knowledge and associated practices, a particular 
identifiable way of giving meaning to reality via words or imagery. Through discourses we perceive 
and understand the social, cultural and material worlds in which we move. Discourses both delimit 
and make possible what can be said and done about phenomena such as risk” (Lupton, 2013a: 23). 
This approach does not deny the importance of quantitative techniques in prospectively organizing 
risk but argues that, rather than ‘revealing’ risks, “these techniques constitute the rhetorical means 
by which risk objects are constructed” (Hardy & Maguire, 2019: 5). In other words, the 
authoritative status of techniques for risk analysis produces “‘truths’ on risk that are then the basis 
for action” (Lupton, 2013a: 113).  
The literature suggests that a tension may arise during the prospective organizing of risk 
between normalizing and problematizing practices. The emphasis on a realist approach has led to a 
predominant set of practices that involve normalizing i.e., transforming future uncertainties into 
knowable, calculable and manageable risks through scientific techniques (see, for example, 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2015). Specific practices include using prevailing scientific methods, 
referencing extant research and invoking established experts so that risk decisions are based on 
‘sound science’ (Maguire & Hardy, 2006; 2013). An alternative set of practices, less commonly 
found, involve problematizing. These practices support a more ‘precautionary approach’ (Maguire 
& Hardy, 2006; Klinke & Renn, 2002) by questioning the ability of existing knowledge to identify 
risks, disputing putative ‘facts’ and challenging established experts as it draws attention to scientific 
uncertainty (Maguire & Hardy, 2013). The tension between normalizing and problematizing is 
significant because, while the tendency to normalize risk may help identify and measure familiar 
risks that are well understood, problematizing may be needed to organize novel, unfamiliar risks 
insofar as it enables action even when the science is uncertain.  
Organizing Risks in Real-Time 
No matter how sophisticated the techniques associated with the prospective organizing of 




case of risk incidents such as crises and disasters. In fact, ‘normal accident theory’ (Perrow, 1984) 
argues that such incidents are a natural consequence of complex and supposedly rational 
organizational systems (Beamish, 2019: Dosdall & Nichelmann, 2019). Incidents like the 
Challenger shuttle disaster are inevitable from time to time simply because the context – space 
exploration – is extremely dangerous (Power, 2016a). Organizations that operate in ‘risky contexts’ 
face the “ever-present potentiality of catastrophe” and, when such contexts become disrupted or 
emergencies arise, risks will materialize (Hällgren et al., 2018: 125).  
Accordingly, one body of literature that informs our understanding of this mode is research 
on crisis and disaster management (Gephart, Miller & Helgesson, 2019; Williams et al., 2017). This 
work often emphasizes the importance of implementing plans developed during the prospective 
mode and centralizing control in order to contain risks as soon as they begin to materialize (e.g., 
Alexander, 2005; Leveson et al., 2009; Perry & Lindell, 2003). For example, organizations may 
engage in stress tests, scenario planning or war-gaming (Kaplan & Mikes, 2012) during the 
prospective mode to find out how a risk is likely to materialize and then develop plans to deal with 
it in the real-time mode in the event that it does. This work also emphasizes the importance of 
complying with predetermined, top-down, command and control protocols to organize risks in real-
time, “where successive hierarchical levels or external agencies cross-check attempts to contain the 
risk, monitor progress, coordinate actions, and approve changes in routines as the risk is deemed to 
worsen or diminish” (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 89).  
A planned, top-down approach, based on expert risk knowledge derived from past 
experience may, however, be inadequate to deal with the exigencies of the present (Weick, 1993). 
Plans only provide general guidelines regarding impending risks, which may manifest themselves in 
very different ways in real-time depending on the particular conditions in a specific local context 
(Sauer, 2003). Accordingly, risks are likely to materialize in unpredictable and unexpected ways 
during an incident, resulting in ambiguity and equivocality (Ash & Smallman, 2008; Macrae, 2007; 




environment and enable individuals to take action (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). As individuals 
make plausible sense of rapidly changing conditions (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005), they may 
deviate from predetermined plans and protocols (Macrae, 2014; Weick, 2010; Whiteman & Cooper, 
2011). In the case of the Fukushima disaster, for example, TEPCO employees were forced to 
improvise in order to vent the reactor without electricity because the company had no plans for 
doing so. Later on, it became clear to the plant manager on site that seawater would be needed to 
cool another reactor because fresh water was unavailable. This decision was challenged by an 
official at the head office in Tokyo, but the plant manager decided to proceed regardless. As a result 
of doing so, the individuals who stabilized the reactor at considerable risk to their personal safety – 
the ‘Fukushima 50’ – were subsequently ostracized by TEPCO and the Japanese government 
(Willacy, 2013).  
High-profile risk incidents are not the only setting for the real-time mode – risks also have 
to be organized in real-time when the prospective mode has deemed that a certain level of risk is 
acceptable, perhaps because the risk is associated with a worthwhile return or because it is costly, 
impractical or even impossible to avoid the risk completely. In this case, the real-time organizing of 
risk involves monitoring the level of risk to ensure that it remains within prescribed standards and 
tolerances (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001). This task is incorporated into many formal risk 
assessment frameworks, such as those produced by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission and the International Organization for Standardization, which provide 
methodologies for reporting and controlling risks once tolerable levels have been identified. In the 
airline industry, the level of risk is tracked in real-time through various flight data monitoring 
systems and the mandatory logging of any incident that occurs outside specified parameters (e.g., 
Palermo, 2016; Power, Ashby & Palermo, 2013). Similarly, risk mapping, risk matrices and various 
other forms of templates, such as ‘value at risk’ limits for an investment portfolio, are used in real-
time to ensure that as risks materialize, levels stay within specified limits (e.g., Hall & Fernando, 




Risks can also be organized in real-time through informal practices that evolve 
incrementally, and which do not make reference to the language of risk or make use of prescribed 
risk techniques. As Corvellec (2009: 287) points out: the “absence of formal risk management and a 
reluctance to use a risk vocabulary … [is] not the same as an absence of risk management” because 
organizations may be capable of organizing risks in real-time through their ordinary managerial 
practices and routines. Insofar as the bulk of literature discussed so far tends to focus attention on 
formal mechanisms – the formal chain of command, formal decision-making processes, and formal 
monitoring and evaluating mechanisms – we know little about how risk is organized when the 
terminology of risk is not explicit and when practices are emergent rather than planned. 
The literature suggests that a tension may arise during the real-time organizing of risk 
between controlling and improvising (Perin, 2005). The predominant set of practices used to 
organize risk in this mode revolves around controlling i.e., the implementation of predetermined 
plans and protocols based on deliberate, rehearsed action in a top-down way. In contrast, 
improvising practices emphasize emergent, exceptional action during incidents and the 
decentralization of authority and responsibility to frontline workers who are often better placed to 
recognize unanticipated trajectories than their superiors located further afield (Perin, 2005; Sauer, 
2003). This tension is significant because, when risk incidents occur, the tendency is to centralize 
control in order to exercise hierarchical oversight standards (Power et al., 2013). However, if risk 
incidents do not follow a predicted trajectory and materialize in unpredicted or unpredictable ways, 
improvising may be called for. However, switching may be difficult because improvising 
contravenes organizational norms of hierarchy and responsibility and workers who do improvise are 
at risk of being blamed for not adhering to standard operating procedures (Hardy & Maguire, 2016).  
Organizing Risks Retrospectively 
Risk is also organized retrospectively, during which the earlier prospective and real-time 
organizing of risk is held up to scrutiny. The main bodies of work relevant to this mode are the 




Public inquiries typically take the form of an ad hoc, high profile committee or panel, often 
commissioned by governments following a major risk incident or ‘near miss’ ostensibly to 
investigate, reflect on and learn from what happened. Risk incidents provoke “both disappointment 
with the way risk was managed and a search for reform. These events are often spectacular and 
headline grabbing … They generate public enquiries, diagnoses, blame and post-disaster 
introspection about what went wrong and how it might have been prevented” (Power, 2016a: 2). 
Recent examples include the Royal Commission into the 2009 Victorian bushfires in response to 
Australia’s most damaging natural disaster; the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) set up 
by Congress in 2009 to examine the causes of the financial crisis in the US; and the 2017 Grenfell 
Tower Fire Inquiry, set up by the UK government after the death of 72 people trapped in a fire 
caused by unsafe cladding. Public inquiries are also held as a result of an accumulation of smaller 
incidents, such as problems for consumers arising from risky lending practices (e.g., the Australian 
Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry) and health problems for patients arising from blood transfusions (e.g., the Infected Blood 
Inquiry in the UK). In such cases, individual incidents may not attract much attention but, at some 
point, trends generate closer inspection, often as a result of media attention or political priorities.  
Hilgartner (2007: 154) argues that public inquiries are an important way to persuade the 
public that the state can successfully deal with future risks: “authorities must address the meaning 
of a disaster as well as the materiality of it. Reclaiming a sense of normalcy may depend on placing 
the episode securely within a narrative frame that restores confidence in the capacity of social 
institutions, especially the state, to protect the citizenry.” Similarly, Burgess (2011) argues that 
public inquiries are a mechanism to meet expectations that pervasive, diffuse risks can – and should 
– be eliminated. Accordingly, research has examined inquiries set up to investigate risk incidents as 
diverse as those involving train travel (Cullen, 2000), gas plants (Hopkins 2008), health care 
(Newdick & Danbury, 2015), terrorism (Parker & Dekker, 2008) and public events (Huber & 




recommendations does not allay fears about risk. On the contrary, it ‘amplifies’ risk (Pidgeon, 
Kasperson & Slovic, 2003), not only “raising the profile of particular threats, but tending to act as a 
permanent reminder. Far from drawing a line under experiences, risk-averse concern tends to 
become embedded” (Burgess, 2011: 6).  
The retrospective organizing of risk also occurs less visibly, inside organizations. Safety 
and/or accident reviews may be mandated by regulatory and/or organizational policy (e.g., Madsen, 
2009). They also follow from the reporting of ‘mishaps’ in the form of debriefing sessions (Catino 
& Patriotta, 2013), as well as ‘after-action’ and ‘post-project’ reviews designed to review safety and 
enhance learning (Ron, Lipshitz & Popper, 2006). Similarly, internal auditors are responsible for 
retrospectively organizing risk in the ‘third line of defence’ used in many financial organizations 
(e.g., Luburic, Perovic & Sekulovic, 2015). The exponential growth of auditing provides the means 
for ‘back tracking’ the circumstances related to a particular risk incident, thereby facilitating the 
retrospective organizing of risk (Power, 2019). Such investigations take place in settings as diverse 
as transport accidents, crime scenes and economic fraud (Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2012), and revise 
internal management systems to improve how risks are handled (Stoop & Dekker, 2012).  
Public inquiries and internal reviews involve investigations that span the ‘epistemological’ 
by establishing what happened, the ‘preventive’ by identifying pathways to avoidance, the ‘moral’ 
by tracing the transgressions that were committed and reinforcing moral and regulatory boundaries, 
and the ‘existential’ by finding an explanation for any suffering that occurred (cf. Dekker, 2015). 
Various forms of deliberation are used to produce an account of what happened, as well as to make 
recommendations for improving how risk is organized in the future (Hardy & Maguire, 2016). The 
past is reconstructed after the event by actors such as judges, experts, professionals and witnesses, 
only some of whom were directly involved in the incident under investigation. Public inquiries tend 
to rely heavily on expert knowledge (e.g., Ainsworth & Hardy, 2012; Brown, 2004; Gephart, 1993; 
Topal, 2009), while, in the case of internal reviews, senior managers, internal auditors and other 




2015). In this regard, risk acts as a ‘forensic resource’ that is used to hold persons accountable and 
to attribute blame (Douglas, 1990).  
The main focus of the research into such investigations is their failure to improve practices 
(Boin, 2008; Dechy et al., 2012; Hayes & Maslen, 2019). Some researchers attribute this failure to 
the type of knowledge that is produced by reviews and inquiries i.e., an authoritative account of 
what happened that is assembled “by aggregating and abstracting the partial knowledge of various 
participants in the hearing or review into a holistic account of the past” (Hardy & Maguire, 2016: 
92). This narrative is then revised and fine-tuned as it is passed among lawyers, safety experts, and 
technical advisors so that “the viewpoints of multiple stakeholders are literally written into the 
regulatory process” (Sauer, 2003: 47). However, this ex post facto knowledge – ‘know-that’ in 
Ryle’s (1949) terms – is very different to ‘know-how’ i.e., the knowledge of those immersed in 
action (Dekker, 2002; Hadjimichael & Tsoukas, 2019). When carrying out their work in situated 
contexts, actors have only partial views of risk and know only of conditions as they unfold around 
them. In contrast, for investigators reviewing an incident, the outcome is known and the sequence 
of events leading to it is reconstructed with the outcome in mind. Therefore, hindsight “does not 
equal foresight. Investigations that are anchored to outcome knowledge run the risk of not capturing 
the complexities and uncertainties facing sharp end personnel and why their actions made sense at 
the time” (Henriksen & Kaplan, 2003: ii46).  
A second reason for the failure of the retrospective mode to bring about improvements in 
how risk is organized is, according to some critics, because inquiries are designed first and foremost 
to deflect criticism of authorities and powerful business interests (Kendra, 2007; Birkland, 2009). 
While reports may make suggestions about how to deal with future risks, their recommendations 
may be more political than remedial, calling for existing systems to be maintained albeit with minor 
modifications (Brown, 2004; Topal, 2009). Linked to this issue is the tendency of the retrospective 
mode to allocate blame and avoid liability (e.g., Alves, Ometto & Guimarães, 2019; Hood, 2002; 




investigations serve to create new links in a sociotechnical system by producing accounts that hook 
“people and things together in a network of cause and blame and guilt” regarding how risk has been 
organized (Hilgartner, 2007: 155). 
The literature suggests that a tension may arise during the retrospective mode between 
blaming and learning. The predominant set of practices used to organize risk in this mode revolves 
around blaming, including the tendency to search for single, linear causes of risk incidents and 
attribute risk incidents to ‘human’ error (Power, 2009; McArdle, Burns & Ireland, 2003; Rose, 
2004). Hood (2002: 36) suggests that there is no such thing as a ‘blame-free’ risk – “the way risk is 
managed depends on the way the blame game plays out” (also see Douglas, 1992). In contrast, 
learning practices emphasize a wider focus on multiple, interacting causalities, acknowledging 
possible systemic defects in risk knowledge and allowing organization-wide participation in 
reporting systems (Palermo, 2016). These practices encourage individuals to admit to errors and to 
be willing to reflect on them, thereby “enabling the organization to identify problems and make 
systemic improvements to its operations” (Lupton & Warren, 2018: 41). The tension between 
blaming and learning is significant because the former appears to preclude the latter (Edmondson, 
2018; Vince & Tahir, 2004). Fear of blame leads managers to initiate inquiries with limited scope 
(Elliott & McGuinness, 2002; Hutter, 1992) and reduces employees’ willingness to report errors 
and near misses, thereby eliminating learning opportunities (McArdle et al., 2003; Waring, 2005).  
Perspectives on Organizing Risk 
The first part of the literature review has focused on the diverse literatures that illuminate 
how risk is organized in three different modes, providing insight into what organizations do when 
they organize risk. In the second part, we discuss three perspectives that researchers use when they 
examine risk from an organizational standpoint – risk culture, risk work, and risk translation. As we 
will show, this work not only adds to our understanding of how risk is organized, but also has the 




insights that we present in the second half of the paper.  
Organizing Risk through Risk Culture 
Connections between risk and culture can be traced back to Mary Douglas’s work which 
established cultural links between group values and collective perceptions of specific risks 
(Douglas, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Douglas was particularly interested in increased 
perceptions of technological risk among members of ‘radical’ groups on the ‘borders’ of society. 
Her explanation was cultural in that she argued that these risks were constructed as part of symbolic 
struggles against mainstream communities. According to this view, risk cultures characterize 
communities that are “constructed in the context of institutional uncertainty of risk, and which may 
work to identify environmental and other risks” (Lash, 2000: 49). This collective notion of risk 
helped to set the scene for viewing groups as having their own, distinct risk cultures, where 
individuals “notice, address, and respond to particular phenomena as risks and fail to attend to other 
potential risks based on cultural logics and beliefs” (Gephart et al., 2009: 144). 
Accordingly, recent research has focused on discrete organizations with cultures in which 
risk is seen as the collective responsibility of all members. One example is research on safety 
cultures (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009; Hoffman & Stetzer, 1998), where “safety is understood to be, 
and is accepted as, the number one priority” (Cooper, 2000: 113). Early work by James Reason 
argued that an ideal safety culture was “the engine that continues to propel the system toward the 
goal of maximum safety health, regardless of the leadership’s personality or current commercial 
concerns” (Reason, 1997: 195). Since then, the concept has become widespread based on an 
assumption that a culture can be engineered to reduce accidents and contain risks (Silbey, 2009). 
Studies single out the importance of such features as training, extensive communication on the 
importance of safety, low thresholds for reporting incidents, flexible employees who are able to 
learn, and protections for whistle-blowers in creating a safety culture (e.g., see Flin et al., 2000; 
Reason, 1998, 2000; Silbey, 2009). However, this work has been criticized for its inability to 




conceptual clarity as to what, exactly, constitutes a safety culture, and a neglect of inequalities in 
power and authority and competing sets of legitimate interests in organizations (Clarke, 2000; Kim 
& Wang, 2009; Silbey, 2009).   
Another example of work that directly or indirectly attends to the notion of a risk culture are 
studies of ‘high-reliability’ organizations (HROs) such as aircraft carriers, chemical plants, health 
care teams and nuclear energy plants (e.g., Bierly & Spender, 1995; Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Klein 
et al., 1995). HROs operate safely in domains where high reliability is important as a result of an 
organizational culture in which leaders prioritize reliability; consensus exists around clear goals; 
wide-ranging redundancies of organizational systems ensure that if one fails another can take over; 
and there is an emphasis on organizational learning. Employees are attentive to minor deviations in 
operations and engage in ‘mindfulness’ or ‘heedful interrelating’ in ways that allow them to 
prevent, respond to and/or learn from risk incidents (e.g., Christianson et al., 2011; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999). Similar cultural attributes are also reported to 
feature prominently in resilient organizations (e.g., Powley, 2009; Van Der Vegt et al., 2015; 
Williams et al., 2017). However, studies of reliability and resilience have been criticized for: failing 
to demonstrate how specific features improve reliability and resilience; concentrating on very 
specific kinds of organizations whose processes may not be transferable, especially to organizations 
facing budgetary or market pressures; taking the organizational hierarchy for granted; and ignoring 
the wider social and political context (e.g., Boin & Schulman, 2008; Busby, 2006; Silbey, 2009). 
The notion of a risk culture has been extended into studies of financial services (Power, 
2020; Power et al., 2013) organizations where some level of risk-taking to capitalize on 
opportunities is viewed as desirable. Rather than focusing on risk avoidance, financial services 
firms strive for an organizational culture that balances the logics of precaution (i.e. safety) and 
opportunity (Palermo et al., 2017) in accordance with their appetite for risk (Pan, Siegel & Wang, 
2017). This balance (or lack thereof), along with the norms, attitudes and behaviours that produce it, 




and, hence, subject to optimization (e.g., Banks, 2012; Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998; Revet & 
Langumier, 2015).  
Many studies present successful examples of organizations whose risk cultures allow them 
to organize risk across all three modes. Insofar as risk culture is seen as an ideational entity – “a 
unified system of values or norms that unequivocally direct the way we think and act” (Giorgi et al., 
2015: 13) – the effort is to engineer an ‘optimal’ culture that can address the three modes. 
Accordingly, risks can be prospectively organized through a culture that focuses employees’ 
attention on anticipating and preventing potential dangers. This reduces the chances of a major risk 
incident occurring but, if one does, then an appropriate risk culture facilitates the real-time 
organizing of risk by activating procedures designed to cope with unexpected events and adapt to 
emerging, unforeseen problems. Finally, organizations with robust risk cultures can retrospectively 
organize risk through the systematic analysis of incidents and near misses to enhance organizational 
learning. The underlying assumption of this work is that an ‘optimal’ risk culture can – or at least 
should – be engineered. Conversely, the failure to organize risk is often attributed to defects in an 
organization’s risk culture (Hopkins, 1999; Palermo et al., 2017; Power et al., 2013).   
Organizing Risk through Risk Work 
A second perspective draws on the concept of ‘risk work,’ which is defined as “situated 
human effort, in combination with material infrastructure, through which risk management and 
governance practices come to be constructed” (Power, 2016a: 3). Following the ‘turn to work’ 
(Phillips & Lawrence, 2012) more generally, this perspective examines how risk is organized 
through the interactions of embedded, embodied agents in particular contexts as they engage in day-
to-day activities (e.g., Palermo, 2016). It assumes that organizational encounters with risk are “a 
routine and systematic part of daily organizational life” (Vaughan, 2005: 33). This perspective thus 
adopts a finely grained, bottom-up focus that directs attention to “the actions and routines through 
which organizational actors make sense of risk, of themselves and their roles, and collectively try to 




processes and practices rather than high-profile, momentous events associated with risk incidents; 
and it sees the identification of risk as an outcome of various forms of risk work rather than 
resulting from applications of expert knowledge grounded in statistical thinking (Corvellec, 2010; 
Boholm, 2010).  
Studies show that risk work can take a number of different forms. For example, Demortain’s 
(2016; 2020) study of the development of a framework for risk assessment in the US government 
(see NAS–NRC, 1983) shows how risk work takes the form of institutional work – formalizing and 
standardizing practices across diverse organizations in fields such as food safety, occupational 
health and environmental protection, thereby reinforcing institutionalized assumptions such as the 
boundary between science and policy. Seemingly mundane practices – forming a committee, 
establishing its terms of reference and setting its agenda, and drafting and redrafting its report – 
strongly influenced the subsequent institutional design of how risk came to be organized. Horlick-
Jones (2005) discusses how risk work in both corporate and government sectors is shaped by 
institutionalized governance guidelines. Maguire & Hardy (2016) show how the institutionalized 
nature of risk work varies depending on the nature of the risk. When the risk is familiar, risk work is 
conducted by experts who occupy central roles in the field and enact routine, institutionalized 
practices. When the risk is unfamiliar or novel, risk work is undertaken by peripheral actors who 
question the appropriateness of the incumbent body of risk knowledge and advocate alternative 
methods and procedures, often generating conflict among organizations in the field. 
Studies of risk work also indicate an important emotional-affective dimension despite risk’s 
strong association with detached, rational calculation. For example, Boholm and Corvellec (2016) 
show how risk work to identify risks involves the enactment of valuation practices. For something 
to be ‘at risk’, it must first be considered sufficiently valuable to merit protection. These authors 
illustrate how value is an outcome of ongoing, situated activities of defining, hierarchizing and 
calculating that serve to condition actors’ preferences. Mikes (2016) shows how risk work can 




studies show how risk work may involve actions to reduce the emotion associated with risk (Gayle 
et al., 2016). For example, as crises emerge, the risk work of authorities may take the form of 
emotion work to avoid panic (Fein & Isaacson, 2009). A study of health risks in hospitals shows 
how risk work by health care workers is performed to manage both workers’ emotions and patients’ 
fear (Fischer & McGivern, 2016).  
Studies adopting the risk work perspective have also demonstrated the important role that 
material artefacts play in organizing risk (Power, 2016b). Whereas work on culture emphasizes the 
symbolic aspects of materiality (see Giorgi, Lockwood & Glynn, 2015), risk work attends to the 
‘affordances’ of materiality (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008) insofar as studies show “action possibilities 
for individuals … inscribed in the material nature of the environment or artefacts” (Carlile et al., 
2013: 4). For example, Vargha’s (2016) study of risk work in financial services organizations 
illustrates how artefacts such as questionnaires and pre-packaged software structured employee-
customer interactions, shaping conclusions concerning customers’ attitudes to risk as well as 
subsequent risk management decisions. Jordan and colleagues (2013) show how the device of the 
risk map, for all its design flaws and simplifications, facilitated a convergent, shared understanding 
of risk among different groups. In an airline setting, Palermo (2016) shows how risk work prior to 
an incident was made easier for pilots by a software application for reporting safety incidents; but 
this same artefact then served as a forensic resource after incidents, constraining pilots while 
enabling the risk work of investigators. Hall and Fernando (2016) study the use of standardized risk 
metrics across diverse divisions in an NGO, showing how an unreflective reliance upon these 
artefacts crowded out local knowledge, leading to too much emphasis on compliance and too little 
on emerging threats. 
These studies of risk work are compatible with the three modes of organizing risk, even 
though they do not explicitly engage with them. Many identify risk work undertaken during the 
prospective mode to identify risks (e.g., Boholm, 2010; Boholm & Corvellec, 2011; Horlick-Jones, 




to reduce negative emotions (e.g., Corvellec, 2009; Hall & Renuka, 2016; Jørgensen & Jordan, 
2016), while others show risk work during the retrospective mode (e.g., Palermo, 2016). 
Organizing Risk through Risk Translation 
Our literature review identified a small but insightful body of research which shows that 
meanings can change – and be changed – through a process known as risk translation. These studies 
draw on the constructionist/discursive approach to risk which emphasizes how meanings in relation 
to risk are attached to particular objects through organizing processes. Insofar as translation, in 
general, refers to the process whereby meanings are transformed (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Zilber, 2006), risk translation refers to the process through which an 
object’s meaning in relation to risk is changed (Czarniawska, 2019). Through translation, a risk to 
an individual may become a risk to one or more organizations; an object that was safe can become 
risky; and, in fact, actors at risk can become safe (Hardy & Maguire, 2019). Risk translations can 
result in strategic or political advantages by helping to “redistribute responsibility for risks, change 
the locus of decision-making, and determine who has the right – and who has the obligation – to ‘do 
something”’ (Hilgartner, 1992: 47). Separate bodies of work have identified two forms of risk 
translation, described below. 
One form of risk translation has been noted in the organizational literature. It occurs when 
risks to individuals are translated into risks to organizations as, for example, when the risk to a 
customer of slipping on a wet floor in a store is translated into a legal risk to the organization 
(Power et al., 2009). As the discourse and language of risk have become more pervasive (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2016; Power, 2004), new categories of organizational risks have emerged. Organizational 
risks now reflect “many different concerns, from the loss of money, time, or other scarce resources, 
to loss of legitimacy and damaged reputation” (Beamish, 2019: 88; also see Annett, 2019). They 
include more recent, operational (Power, 2005), reputational (Power et al., 2009; Scott & Walsham, 
2005) and strategic risks (Slywotzky & Drzik, 2005), in addition to longstanding regulatory, 




for organizational risk translation (Maguire & Hardy, 2019) and a single risk object can be 
translated into multiple risks to diverse organizations. For example, Hardy and Maguire (2019) 
show how health risks to individuals from products containing the potentially toxic chemical 
bisphenol A (BPA) were translated into a wide range of different organizational risks – regulatory 
risk to manufacturers, reputational risk to retail organizations and NGOs, operational risk to 
regulators, and professional risk to scientists.  
A second form of risk translation has been noted in the governmentality literature, although 
the specific term has not been used (e.g., Ewald, 1991, Rose, 2001; O’Malley, 2004). This literature 
draws explicitly from the work of Foucault (1980; 1991) and focuses on how risks such as 
unemployment, old age, illness, etc., which once would have been borne by the state, have become 
‘individualized’ i.e., risks to state organizations have been translated into risks to individuals 
(Binkley, 2009; Elliott, 2002; Stypinska, 2018; Vaz & Bruno, 2003). For example, the neo-liberal 
discourse of ‘enterprise’ (Du Gay, 1996) encourages citizens to be enterprising – to take on more 
risks and assume responsibility for managing them (Ainsworth & Hardy, 2008; Hacker, 2006). In 
this way, individualizing risk helps to remove state obligations to manage risks by shifting the 
welfare state “away from shared responsibility for managing social risks through collective pooling 
mechanisms towards more individualized responsibility for managing life course risks such as 
unemployment, parenthood and disability” (Hamilton, 2014: 453). 
The consequences of this form of risk translation can be significant. Whereas citizens and 
governments once shared these risks, citizens are now expected to bear more of the risks and to take 
responsibility for managing them. If they fail, they can become viewed as risk producers: 
individuals at risk of mental health problems are held responsible for producing risks that endanger 
the public (Callaghan & Grundy, 2018); refugees at risk from persecution become risks to national 
borders (Watkins, 2017); and HIV-positive individuals facing various health risks are seen as 
posing risks to others (Davis, 2007). This, in turn, authorizes the state to implement sanctions 




Vulnerable, marginalized individuals are thus further disempowered as they “are exposed to more 
risks but are also themselves categorized as bad risks” (Doyle, 2007: 8). We can see, then, a link 
between how risk is organized and inequality (Curran, 2016): many environmental and health risks 
disproportionally affect disadvantaged groups; the disadvantaged are less able to address the risks 
they face than society’s elites; and techniques for managing risk often distribute costs and burdens 
in ways that exacerbate levels of inequality (Centre for the Study of Risk Inequality, 2020).  
As with the other two perspectives, the work on risk translations does not explicitly 
articulate any reference to the three modes of organizing risk. However, we argue that it, too, is 
consistent with this conceptualization. Insofar as risks to individuals are translated into new 
categories of organizational risk, the assumption is that the organizations that translate them will 
then organize them, whether it be prospectively, in real-time, or retrospectively. Translations that 
individualize risk help to ensure that individuals will take over organizing risk from government 
organizations. In other words, organizing risk still occurs when risks are translated, albeit that a 
different actor takes on – or is made to take on – responsibility. 
Recapping our review of the literature (see Table 1), we first examined how separate bodies 
of literature on risk provide insight into three different modes for organizing risk. Our review also 
examined three perspectives which use different analytic frameworks for understanding how risk is 
organized – risk culture, risk work and risk translation. While these perspectives do not explicitly 
engage with our conceptualization of three modes, they nonetheless contribute to our understanding 
of them and, potentially, cut across more than one mode. In this regard, they provide an important 
resource for our subsequent insights into a cycle of organizing risk, discussed in the next section.  
—Table 1 near here— 
CRITICAL ISSUES AND NEW INSIGHTS 
In this section, we present three critical issues that we identified from our review of the 
literature. The first critical issue concerns the tendency of the risk literature to focus on a single 




modes. Accordingly, we present a series of new insights that allow us to develop further the concept 
of a ‘risk cycle’ and discuss how organizations transition from one mode to another. The second 
critical issue concerns the tensions that characterize each of the three modes – although the existing 
literature acknowledges that such tensions exist, it offers little understanding of how organizations 
deal with them. Accordingly, we present a series of new insights that show how the risk work 
perspective can contribute to our understanding of these tensions. The third critical issue concerns 
how risk translations not only change the meaning of objects in relation to risk, but also change 
power relations among actors. Accordingly, we present a series of new insights that help 
researchers understand the way in which organizing risk is situated in a larger socio-political 
context.  
The Risk Cycle  
The first critical issue arises because much of the literature focuses on only one of the three 
modes for organizing risk. In contrast, our integrated approach enables us to develop the insight that 
organizations are involved in more than one mode and, in fact, engage with a cycle of organizing 
risk (Figure 1). A cycle of risk arises when, despite using various techniques to organize risks 
prospectively, some risks nonetheless materialize and have to be organized in real-time; and, 
subsequent to such incidents (including near misses), these risks are then organized retrospectively 
through some sort of review or investigation, ostensibly with the aim of improving how risk is 
organized in the future. For example, firefighting organizations engage with a risk cycle when they 
prospectively take steps to reduce the likelihood of bushfires breaking out (Chen, Blong & 
Jacobson, 2003). However, as recent events in California and Australia show, fires inevitably break 
out, resulting in real-time firefighting (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). After a fire, particularly if there is 
a notable loss of life and/or property, there is usually some kind of review to investigate, attribute 
causality, and recommend changes in future firefighting practices (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Stern, 




Figure 1: The Risk Cycle 
 
The risk cycle can take different forms. A single organization may engage with all three 
modes as in the bushfire example above. Alternatively, different organizations may be involved. 
For example, in case of foot & mouth disease in the UK (Delgado et al., 2017), farmers play a key 
role in the prospective mode by monitoring their livestock; the government becomes more actively 
involved in the real-time mode by culling affected herds and implementing quarantine measures; 
and, following a breakout, an independent inquiry is often assigned responsibility for the 
retrospective mode. Many organizations start to engage with the risk cycle during the prospective 
mode – as they identify risks that they then seek to prevent or reduce. However, if the risk was not 
anticipated, the organization may only start to engage with the risk cycle when the risk materializes 
(i.e., in the real-time mode). It is also possible for the risk cycle to begin with the retrospective 
mode if the language of risk is first used during a review to reconstruct prior events, which then 
forms the basis of how similar events will be organized during subsequent modes in the future, i.e. 
as risks. 
The fragmented nature of the literature is problematic because it diverts attention away from 
the ongoing, continuous way in which risk is organized. This, in turn, makes it difficult to 
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understand how organizations transition between modes. Consequently, researchers know very little 
about a range of questions. What sets transitions between the modes in motion? What is the nature 
of any ‘handover’ between actors involved in the transition? What is the nature of the demarcation 
between the two modes involved in the transition? Why is the transition important? Accordingly, in 
the remainder of this section we offer our insights regarding these questions (see Table 2 for a 
summary).  
—Table 2 near here— 
 Transitions from the prospective to the real-time mode: we propose that the switch from 
predicting and/or avoiding risk incidents to dealing with them as they materialize is more likely to 
be set in motion when there is a familiar, widely recognized trigger. In the bushfire example above, 
when a planned, precautionary fire carried out to reduce fuel loads during the prospective mode 
breaks through designated containment lines, the real-time mode quickly follows. In some cases, 
however, the trigger may not be so clear. For example, in the early days of SARS (and more 
currently, in the case of COVID-19), organizations were slow to recognize and act on its symptoms, 
which are similar to those of influenza (Hong & Collins, 2006). The result was that the transition 
into the real-time mode – taking steps to contain the spread of SARS in the community – was 
delayed, leading to the infection of additional individuals (Salehi & Ali, 2006).  
As far as handovers during this transition are concerned, different dynamics are likely to 
occur if the actors involved in prospectively organizing risk are also responsible for organizing it in 
real-time, compared to situations where responsibility is handed over to other actors. In the former 
case, abandoning the ‘cool’ monitoring of risks associated with the prospective mode and switching 
into a ‘hot’ emergency response as a risk begins to materialize may be difficult, even though lives 
may depend on it as, for example, when bushfire risks materialize (Weick, 1993). If different actors 
are involved, it seems likely that the transition will be adversely affected if there is conflict or a lack 
of collaboration among them, as appears to have been the case of the 2003 outbreak of SARS in 




between federal, provincial, and territorial governments over the division of jurisdictional 
responsibilities” (Salehi & Ali, 2006: 378).  
A third insight regarding this transition is that it is important not to assume that the different 
modes are necessarily clearly demarcated. In some cases, organizations may intentionally blur the 
boundary between them. For example, the risk associated with mid-air collisions is organized 
prospectively through ‘rules of separation’ that establish a minimum allowable distance between 
aircraft (Vaughan, 2005). If these rules are violated, pilots are instructed to change the aircraft’s 
speed and/or trajectory to regain adequate distance from other aircraft. In this way, the real-time 
organizing of a ‘proxy’ risk, i.e. breaching rules of separation, is, therefore a way of organizing the 
‘high stakes’ risk prospectively. Given that the negative consequences of the latter are significant, 
blurring the boundary between the prospective and real-time modes through proxy risks may be an 
important way to organize particularly consequential risks. 
Transitions from real-time to retrospective mode: we suggest that this transition – whereby 
a risk incident becomes subjected to investigation – can be triggered either routinely or 
exceptionally. In the former case, particular features of an incident, such as aircraft malfunctioning 
or losses from bad loans that exceed some threshold in a banking context, automatically lead to an 
inquiry or review. In the latter case, deliberations after an incident influence its status as earlier 
events are re-constructed as having been sufficiently significant to be submitted to retrospective 
organizing protocols. In both routine and exceptional cases, the transition involves an event being 
categorized as a ‘risk incident’ through various practices, whether they involve taken-for-granted 
triggers that prompt automatic responses or idiosyncratic ones that emerge from highly contested, 
politicized deliberations. What constitutes a trigger, how they are selected and whether they are 
constructed after the fact are all questions that deserve further investigation. Similarly, we also need 
to know more about the failure to set this transition in motion by, for example, sweeping incidents 
‘under the carpet’ through risk denial and risk minimization. 




of those involved in the real-time organizing of risk are scrutinized by separate, ‘independent’ 
investigators, who may be from a different organizational unit or from outside the organization, to 
pinpoint what “people missed and should not have missed; what they did not do but should have 
done” (Dekker, 2002: 373). Such handovers are taken-for-granted and the ability of individuals who 
were not involved in the risk incident to look back – over time and from a distance – and to judge 
the actions of actors who were directly involved is rarely questioned. Moreover, the two modes are 
assumed to be clearly demarcated insofar as an incident is seen as a self-contained episode whose 
‘facts’ can be ascertained at a later stage even though the two modes may, in fact, interpolate each 
other. What can be known after an incident depends on what was measured, observed and noted 
during it; and the past can be ‘rewritten’ during an inquiry or review and, in this way, become the 
official account of what happened. 
Transitions from retrospective to prospective mode: we know little about what happens 
after an inquiry and whether it has an impact on subsequent risk cycles – whether the retrospection 
associated with some form of inquiry leads to action regarding how risk is organized in the future. 
With regard to the handover, recommendations made by an external inquiry are typically handed 
back to the organization(s) involved in the incident to implement. Internal handovers often involve 
employees with forensic roles, such as accountants and engineers, handing responsibility back to 
management for any recommended restructuring, retraining, etc. In neither case do we know much 
about how these handovers take place or how abstract knowledge produced through an inquiry 
becomes embedded in organizational practices and processes. Nor do we know much about the 
circumstances that produce a clear demarcation between the modes i.e., a ‘fresh start’ – with the 
implementation of dramatically different organizational practices and processes for organizing risk, 
such as significant changes in personnel, new technologies, etc. – compared to those that lead to 
minor adaptations or no change at all.  
In sum, the insight that organizations engage with a risk cycle draws attention to the need 




engage with multiple modes and transition between them. It is important to learn more about how 
organizations move through the risk cycle because delays or failures in transitioning can intensify 
the negative effects of a materializing risk, making it harder to organize effectively in real-time; 
result in risk incidents being swept under the carpet; and/or preclude opportunities for actioning 
new risk knowledge.  
Addressing Tensions in the Risk Cycle 
Our review of the literature indicated that each of the three modes was associated with 
potential tensions between two sets of practices. These tensions are a critical issue insofar as the 
existing literature fails to explain why they exist or identify how organizations might address them. 
Consequently, researchers know very little about a range of questions. Why do the tensions arise 
i.e., why do organizations find it difficult to enact alternative practices, switch between predominant 
and alternative practices or combine the two sets of practices contemporaneously? Why are the 
tensions important? Why is the existing literature limited in terms of shedding light on these 
tensions? What contributions can research adopting the risk culture perspective provide? What does 
the newly emerging risk work perspective offer in terms of studying, explaining and resolving the 
tensions? Accordingly, in the remainder of this section, we offer our insights regarding these 
questions (see Table 3 for a summary).  
—Table 3 near here— 
The tension between normalizing and problematizing: this tension arises because of 
common preconceptions about the nature of risk knowledge and power relations. Specifically, the 
knowledge on which normalizing is based is assumed to be value-free and apolitical even though it 
may be the outcome of prior contestation; while the dominance of science and legitimacy of experts 
is taken-for-granted. In contrast, problematizing involves challenging experts and questioning 
scientific knowledge. As a result, it is often seen as leading to the politicization of risk, making it 




change. Accordingly, organizations are more likely to enact normalizing practices and view the 
alternative – problematizing – with suspicion. This is problematic since, while normalizing 
practices may allow organizations to address familiar risks prospectively, problematizing may be 
needed to organize novel risks.  
The problem is compounded because the dominance of the realist approach in the literature 
pertaining to the prospective mode results in many more studies of normalizing than of 
problematizing. Studies based on the idea of a risk culture as an ideational entity offer some insights 
into this tension by providing rich examples of organizations that have been successful in 
preventing risks from materializing. If risk culture is also seen as ongoing process whereby actors 
draw upon established practices, categories and meanings in the course of their work (see, for 
example, McQueen, 2020), the concept of risk culture becomes more open-ended, allowing for the 
consideration of the difficulties associated with problematizing, such as when risks cannot be 
calculated. 
Research based on the risk work perspective focuses on the day-to-day actions and struggles 
of all actors – expert and non-expert – to create and apply risk knowledge of some form or another 
to identify risks. In doing so, it is able to specify the distinct practices that are enacted, by whom, 
where and why, thereby helping to add additional insight into how risk cultures are created, 
maintained and changed. In identifying these practices, it is agnostic as to whether the apparent 
certainty associated with the existing scientific body of risk knowledge should serve as a basis for 
organizing risk or whether organizations should pay more attention to scientific uncertainty and 
take a precautionary approach. Also, risk work’s attention to the affordances of materiality takes 
into account the way in which many artefacts used in the prospective mode – such as 
instrumentation for assessing water quality and associated health risks that has been designed to 
detect only a limited number of familiar, known contaminants – promote and reinforce normalizing 
rather than problematizing. In this way, studies of risk work have the potential to identify 




normalizing and problematizing practices can be combined, substituted for each other and/or 
distributed across different roles and units.  
The tension between controlling and improvising: this tension arises because of common 
preconceptions that privilege risk knowledge embedded in pre-existing, formal protocols and plans 
and the authority of senior members of the hierarchy. As a result, controlling practices are more 
likely to be enacted as risks materialize; in fact, the centralization of formal authority is a common 
and immediate response to many crises. In contrast, individual attempts to improvise may be 
interpreted as challenges to authority based on imperfect knowledge and deemed irresponsible, 
especially during emergencies. In addition, organizations may find it hard to identify in advance the 
circumstances under which, or degree to which, they will allow employees to improvise. This is 
problematic because, while controlling may ensure the centralization and standardization needed to 
deal with anticipated, well-rehearsed risk incidents, improvising may be needed if the risk 
materializes in unexpected ways.   
The problem is compounded since much of the literature pertaining to the real-time mode 
involves studies of controlling rather than improvising. Studies of crises and disasters often feature 
the implementation of previously prepared plans that employees are expected to follow during an 
emergency. The research on risk monitoring also emphasizes the use of standard operating 
procedures that have been developed centrally – either within the organization or by regulators – to 
assess on an ongoing basis whether stipulated risk levels are being exceeded and, if so, prescribe 
corrective actions. Sensemaking studies do examine improvising during crises, but they rarely 
interrogate it by investigating how the fundamental organizational conflict between centralizing and 
decentralizing responsibility is resolved to allow improvising to occur. Studies of risk cultures show 
that certain organizations, such as HROs, are able to engage in both controlling and improvising, 
although they rarely discuss how the local, tacit and embodied risk knowledge of front-line 
employees is incorporated into organizational decisions and actions.  




of all actors as they navigate codified and tacit forms of knowledge, regardless of their place in the 
hierarchy. It therefore contributes to our understanding of risk cultures by identifying the specific 
ways in which the risk knowledge of front-line employees is incorporated into organizational 
decisions and actions, as well as how those lower down the hierarchy are able to secure sufficient 
autonomy and discretion to improvise. In doing so, this perspective accepts both pre-existing, 
codified knowledge and local, tacit/embodied knowledge as a viable basis for organizing risk in 
real-time. Additionally, its attention to materiality helps to explain why certain artefacts used in the 
real-time mode – such as checklists that direct workers’ attention to anticipated equipment failures 
but not to equipment assumed to be fail-safe, or communications infrastructure that channels 
facility operational data to a remote, centralized crisis management location, but not to local 
workers during an emergency – often promote and reinforce controlling rather than improvising. In 
this way, studies of risk work have the potential to illuminate difficulties in enacting improvising 
practices, as well as shed light on how controlling and improvising can be combined, substituted for 
each other and/or distributed across roles or units.  
The tension between blaming and learning: this tension arises because of common 
preconceptions that privilege new risk knowledge developed by post hoc, independent reviews and 
inquiries, where the expertise of experts and the authority of adjudicators are considered more 
legitimate than the experience of frontline workers and laypeople involved in, or witnesses to, a risk 
incident. Blaming often plays a major role in the retrospective mode because inquiries are charged 
with a wider remit of assigning accountability and dispensing justice. Blaming may also be 
accepted because, when directed at individuals rather than systems, it avoids more fundamental 
critiques that might threaten vested interests. This is problematic because, although blaming may 
assuage demands for accountability and justice, it can preclude the learning required for 
improvements to be made in how risk is organized in the future.  
The problem is compounded because studies of public inquiries tend to focus on explaining 




about. Studies of risk culture help us understand how particular cultural attributes contribute to 
organizational learning from risk incidents. However, by focusing on the risk cultures of individual 
organizations, they tend to underplay broader social/political pressures, such as a strong public 
appetite for blaming, a media industry that revels in ‘blameworthy’ stories and the vested interests 
favouring the political status quo. Without acknowledging the moral function of inquiries and 
political interests of stakeholders, it is difficult to develop a deeper understanding of why this 
tension arises. 
Research based on the risk work perspective focuses on the day-to-day actions and struggles 
of all actors – independent experts and lay persons, as well as those inside and outside the 
organization – in interpreting risk incidents. It is open to the idea that both holistic, convergent 
accounts and local, partial, potentially contradictory accounts can contribute to the development of 
new risk knowledge. Additionally, its attention to materiality helps to explain why certain artefacts 
used in the retrospective mode – such as, following an accident, the forensic use of data generated 
by software that recorded all interactions that workers had with it during the accident – may 
promote blaming rather than learning. In this way, studies of risk work have the potential to 
illuminate the difficulties in enacting learning practices, as well as shed light on whether it is 
possible to combine demands for justice with demands that incidents never happen again.  
In sum, the risk tensions are important in that they make it difficult for organizations to 
navigate between different sets of practices which, in turn, may hamper their ability to organize risk 
across the risk cycle. The work on risk culture offers some insights into organizations that have 
addressed these tensions. Studies of risk work enrich these insights by focusing on what actors do in 
specific contexts through the mobilization of particular resources and material affordances to 
generate risk-related understandings. By exploring tensions as an emergent, evolving outcome of 
the enactment of situated, socio-material practices, the risk work perspective helps to illuminate the 




Translating Risk: Towards a Bigger Picture   
Our review of the literature indicated that the meaning of an object in relation to risk is not 
singular and stable and can, in fact, change through risk translation. However, risk translation 
remains an under-researched area in the organizational literature, giving rise to a critical issue 
insofar as researchers know very little about a range of important questions. What are the dynamics 
of different translations? What discourses facilitate risk translation? What are the implications of 
risk translation for power relations? What are the implications for the risk cycle? Why is it 
important to study risk translations? Accordingly, we offer our insights regarding these questions by 
building on the two forms of risk translation identified in the existing literature – organizational risk 
translations and individualizing risk translations. In this way, we help researchers to understand the 
‘bigger picture’ i.e., the way in which organizing risk is situated in – and contributes to – a larger 
socio-political context (see Table 4 for a summary).  
—Table 4 near here— 
Organizational risk translations: as discussed in the literature review, one form of risk 
translation occurs when the meaning of a risk object that threatens an individual is translated into 
one or more categories of organizational risk, thereby potentially affecting multiple organizations. 
Accordingly, risks can proliferate as the original object continues to pose a risk to something valued 
by individuals, but also becomes associated with risks to things valued by organizations. For 
example, risks of modern slavery to vulnerable workers working in upstream manufacturers can be 
translated into reputational and legal risks to downstream retailers and, if retailers then demand 
‘slavery-free’ practices on the part of suppliers, into operational and strategic risks to these 
organizations (Hardy, Bhakoo & Maguire, 2020). This form of risk translation is facilitated by the 
intensification of the dominant discourse of risk which, by creating ever more nuanced subdivisions 
of risks to organizations’ reputations, operations, finances and so forth, has expanded the conditions 
of possibility for this form of translation. It is also facilitated by the intersection of the discourse of 




While this form of risk translation increases the number of risks that an organization may 
face, it also increases its power to act on those risks. Organizations may struggle to understand risks 
to individuals associated with, for example, climate change, pollution, or infectious diseases since 
these risks are complex and organizational responsibilities are unclear. However, organizations 
usually do know what to do when they face specific legal, financial, regulatory, reputational, 
operational or strategic risks to themselves. Policies, routines and techniques are often already in 
place. Accordingly, this form of risk translation is potentially ‘performative’ (cf. Austin, 1962) in 
that the language of risk does not simply bring a new organizational risk into existence, it also 
generates capabilities that enable organizations to deal with it.  
Additionally, by reconfiguring power relations among actors, organizational risk translation 
may be harnessed by some actors to pressure organizations to act on risks to individuals which they 
otherwise might not. In the example of modern slavery, early research indicates a relatively low 
level of compliance with recent legislation because financial penalties are small and the costs of 
making supply chains compliant are high (e.g., Kim & Davis, 2016). However, the cost-benefit 
analysis of compliance or not changes if, for example, NGOs and the media translate individual 
risks to vulnerable workers into reputational risks to organizations through naming and shaming 
campaigns. Consumers can then exercise power by buying brands whose supply chains are not 
marked by modern slavery. Translating organizational risks is, then, a way to encourage 
organizations to engage with the risk cycle, thereby indirectly taking action on risks to individuals. 
Individualizing risk translations: in this form of translation, risks to organizations are 
translated into risks to individuals. While existing research has focused almost exclusively on 
government organizations, we suggest that this form of risk translation also takes place in the 
organizational sphere more generally, and that it increases the power of organizations over 
individuals. Further, it may contribute to inequality as, often, vulnerable individuals are required to 
bear the burden of risks that once would have been the responsibility of organizations. For example, 




Wrzesniewski, 2019) means that, rather than the organization having to bear the risks of an 
economic downturn and fluctuating demand, it is now workers who risk losing their jobs and who 
must take responsibility for making themselves employable in order to find a new one (Neff, 2012), 
with unskilled workers in precarious roles particularly vulnerable. Similarly, the decline of defined 
benefits pension plans means that employees now bear risks that have been shifted to them from 
their employers (Cobb, 2015). Employees are also encouraged to manage more risks inside 
organizations. For example, in the case of workplace safety, it has been noted that employees are 
increasingly expected to practice individual responsibility by asking questions, making complaints 
and exercising safety rights (Gray, 2009). A similar process appears to be occurring with other 
workplace risks such as bullying, sexual harassment and discrimination as employees are required 
to undertake the necessary training and then to carry out designated steps to organize risks 
individually. 
Individualizing risk translations are facilitated by discourses such as ‘flexibilization,’ which 
emphasizes the importance of ensuring that workforces are flexible and organizations are agile (see, 
for example, Dunford et al., 2013), ‘privatization,’ which emphasises the importance of individuals 
taking responsibility for risks associated with work (see for example, Neff, 2012), and 
‘responsibilization’ (Silbey, 2009). These discourses are not new to organizations, having long been 
bound up with the broader discourse of neo-liberalism (see Fairclough, 2002). However, they have 
intensified with new information technologies, expansion of the gig economy and deregulation.  
Individualizing translations increase the organization’s power over individuals by forcing 
the latter to take on more risk work. This form of risk translation is repressive: organizations bear 
fewer risks themselves, have fewer obligations to help their employees shoulder the risks that they 
face, and are less accountable when they fail to organize workplace risks to individual employees. 
As a result, the organization’s need to invest in measures for dealing with risks to individuals are 
reduced as this responsibility falls on employees. As far as the risk cycle is concerned, individuals 




organization. However, organizations tend to retain control of the retrospective mode, enabling 
them to label any ‘failures’ in organizing risk by individual employees and to sanction them 
accordingly.  
In sum, we argue that risk translations are an important complement to the risk cycle – 
instead of studying a single risk in isolation as it is organized through the risk cycle, researchers 
should ascertain how the meaning of certain objects in relation to risk changes and, in so doing, 
reconfigures power relations among actors. In this way the study of risk translations helps 
organizational scholars to see the bigger, socio-political picture in two ways. First, organizational 
risk translations may be leveraged to generate organizational action on significant individual and 
societal risks. Second, individualizing risk translations often involve increasing the power of the 
organization at the expense of individual employees, which can contribute to inequality insomuch 
as vulnerable individuals have bear the burden of risks that would once have been the responsibility 
of organizations.   
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
In this section, we discuss avenues for future research on organizing risk. Having raised 
substantive questions regarding risk that future research could investigate in the previous section, 
we now explore methodological and analytical approaches that would seem to be particularly useful 
for investigating these questions.  
Processual Studies of Risk 
Given the fragmented nature of the risk literature, there is clearly a need for more 
integrative, processual research that takes into account all three modes of the risk cycle, as well as 
the transitions between them. To do so, researchers first need to select settings for their studies 
where the different modes can be investigated. One such setting concerns organizations operating in 
risky contexts which engage with the entire risk cycle over time and under extreme conditions. The 




these circumstances, making it easier for researchers to study them. Future research could also 
study the risk cycle in organizations that operate in more ‘mundane’ risk environments. For 
example, most universities require academics to organize risks to research subjects prospectively as 
part of securing ethics approval. In the event that risks materialize during the study, universities 
have procedures for dealing with them, as well as for reviewing incidents after the fact, which may 
then lead the university to revise its subsequent approval processes. Risk is being organized 
cyclically albeit in a more low-key manner than organizations in more extreme conditions. 
Comparisons could be made between ‘high profile’ and ‘low profile’ risk cycles. Researchers 
interested in exploring intra-organizational vs. inter-organizational coordination in organizing risk 
could compare settings where a single organization is responsible for the entire risk cycle with those 
where multiple organizations are involved.  
Another setting for future integrative, processual research would be situations where risk 
cycles have ‘failed’ in some way, particularly where consequences have been significant. For 
example, in the case of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it appears that the failure of financial 
institutions to organize risk effectively in the prospective mode led them to take on too much risk. 
These risks then materialized as major companies started to collapse, at which point it appears that 
the government failed to organize the risks effectively in real-time, thus adding “to the uncertainty 
and panic in the financial markets” (FCIC, 2011: xxi). Many commentators also point to the failure 
of the retrospective mode since, despite many investigations and reviews, the financial system is 
“in many respects, still unchanged from what existed on the eve of the crisis” (FCIC, 2011: 
xxvii). The lens of the risk cycle could be used to investigate examples like this one, which involves 
the failure of multiple organizations, and compare them with studies of failed risk cycles inside 
individual organizations.  
The adoption of an explicitly processual methodology (Langley et al., 2013) would aid in 
tracing the activities of organizations as they transition through the risk cycle. The easiest way 




starting with an outcome such as an incident or inquiry and then tracking backwards to see how risk 
was organized during preceding modes using interviews and/or archival data. In these settings, there 
is likely to be a ‘thread’ of documentation that could be tracked backwards relatively easily. 
Processual studies can also track events forwards (Langley, 2007). However, this option is likely to 
be more challenging and open-ended insofar as it would require a longitudinal study using an 
ethnography or multi-phased interviews to follow a risk being organized in one mode to see 
whether and how it moves through subsequent modes and/or what happens if these transitions do 
not occur. Processual studies will help to shed light on how organizations switch from planning to 
acting as risks materialize, what leads to a risk incident becoming the subject of an inquiry or not, 
and the circumstances under which the retrospective mode leads to significant changes in how risk 
is organized.   
Practice-based Studies of Risk 
To investigate the risk tensions, we advocate ethnographic studies that capture rich 
descriptions of the practices that constitute risk work and provide grounded, bottom-up and less 
rationalistically biased accounts of how actors recognize, experience and manage the tensions. By 
adopting a finely-grained ‘turn to work’ methodology (e.g., Barley & Kunda, 2001; Phillips & 
Lawrence, 2012), researchers can examine how actors, immersed in a practice, draw on certain 
discourses, use material artefacts, and engage in ‘skilful’ risk work to resolve the tensions that may 
arise in each mode (cf. Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2016). In this way, a 
practice approach would both contribute to studies of risk cultures and help to develop the concept 
of risk work.  
Additionally, by highlighting how the material and the social are ‘entangled’ with each other 
(Barad, 2003; Lupton, 2013b), practice-based research is able to ascertain the significant role that 
corporeality and materiality play in organizing risk. Taking materiality seriously is important given 




risk, we see only an inscription of it: a balance sheet prospectively indicates a risk of bankruptcy; a 
Geiger counter denotes a real-time risk of radioactivity; a CCTV video played at an inquiry 
signifies an earlier risk of overcrowding in a football stadium. To develop our understanding of the 
role of materiality in organizing risk, studies could, for example, follow a particular artefact through 
the risk cycle to see how something like a pilot’s checklist does not only identify particular risks 
prospectively, but also influences how risk is organized in real-time and provides a forensic audit 
trail after incidents which shapes the retrospective mode (see Power, 2016b).  
Critical Studies of Risk 
Finally, if we are to understand the power effects of risk translations, we advocate an 
explicitly critical perspective. This involves designing studies that are sensitive to “themes of social 
injustice and environmental destruction wrought by organizations” (Adler, Forbes & Willmott, 
2007: 1). A critical approach ‘de-naturalizes’ the taken-for-granted nature of managerial interests 
and instrumental reasoning and focuses, instead, on “exploitation, repression, unfairness, [and] 
asymmetrical power relations” (Alvesson & Deetz, 2006: 256). As far as risk is concerned, the vast 
majority of research adopts rational, managerialist assumptions – studies of the power effects of risk 
translations are rare in organizational research. Accordingly, we suggest that critically oriented case 
studies of the risk cycle would explicitly investigate how power asymmetries both shape and 
emerge from organizing risk. Freed of managerialist assumptions, such studies can engage in more 
integrative theorizing that does not simply look at risk from the perspective of particular power 
holders but takes into account the network of the diverse stakeholders that are involved.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have explored how risk has become a crucial part of organizing, affecting a 
wide range of organizations in diverse sectors. We have shown that risk is organized in three 
different, though sometimes overlapping, modes – prospective, real-time, and retrospective – that 




although it does not always use the language of risk, and it tends to be fragmented insofar as each 
stream of research tends to focus on a single mode. Accordingly, our aim has been to integrate 
diverse bodies of research in order to identify a cycle of organizing risk and to provide new insights 
into the transitions, tensions and translations related to risk.  
In some respects, risk is reminiscent of the way in which the concept of strategy permeated 
organizations in the latter decades of the last century, extending far beyond its base in multi-
divisional manufacturing firms to infiltrate all kinds of public, private, governmental and NGOs. 
Today, there are few organizations that do not ‘have’ a strategy; 50 years ago, there would have 
been few that did. A similar expansionary phenomenon can be seen in the case of risk. In the case 
of strategy, academics scrambled to catch up with the growth of strategy initiatives in organizations. 
Initially, they focused on refining technical models for elaborating how strategy should be 
formulated (Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1979). It took some time before critics started to detect the 
limitations of strategy (Mintzberg, 1973; Pascale, 1984); and longer still, before scholars identified 
the practices associated with ‘doing’ strategy (Whittington 1996) and unpicked the discourse of 
strategy to show its dominating effects (Knights & Morgan, 1991).  
We cannot afford to waste time with risk. Risk has a far wider domain than strategy – it does 
not just pertain to organizational success but is bound up with pressing grand challenges (Ferraro, 
Etzion & Gehman, 2015) and wicked problems (Palmer, 2012). Many of the biggest risks 
confronting humanity cannot be well defined, much less neatly quantified (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 
1999a, 1999b) and, yet, a considerable amount of research on risk continues to rely on a realist, 
technical approach. There is, then, considerable opportunity for organizational scholars to submit 
dominant understandings concerning risk to greater empirical and theoretical scrutiny, which, in 
turn, could greatly benefit the planet and the peoples on it. In fact, the importance of understanding 
how risk is organized and, in particular, the implications of the risk cycle have been unmistakably 
underlined by the COVID-19 pandemic, which is occurring as we write. Governments, private 




unimaginably rapid and continuous basis. Each day has seen a cycle of trying to prevent 
momentous health risks from materializing; frantically addressing them in real-time – juggling 
command and control protocols with significant improvisation in order to do so; and then reflecting 
upon efforts and outcomes in order to recalibrate attempts to organize the risks only a few days 
later. Governments have taken decisions based on quantitative risk modelling but the fact that 
COVID-19 is a novel coronavirus introduces extensive scientific uncertainty. Various governments 
– and, many would argue, the more effective ones – have adopted a precautionary, problematizing 
approach in addition to actions based on scientific advice. Accordingly, we see the need for 
organizations to transition through the risk cycle regularly, repeatedly and rapidly, addressing the 
tensions as they play out in each mode. We also see the importance of risk translation as 
organizations of all kinds have translated the health risks to individuals into risks to themselves, the 
economy and society, which reverberate back into risks to other organizations. We hope that when 
this paper is published, the pandemic will be over and, as we look back, blaming about the origins 
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TABLE 1: Summary of the Literature Review on Organizing Risk 




Risk analysis/perception; risk 
controversies; risk 
construction/risk discourse  
Crises, disasters/accidents; 




Key findings Risk analysis is guided by 
realist, objectivist 
understandings of risk and 
optimism regarding 
organizations’ ability to 
deal with it 
Laypersons’ perceptions of 
risk are subject to bias 
Divergent views of risk are 
common and result in 
conflict and controversy 
The constructionist approach 
challenges the existence of 
pre-existing risks  
The dominant discourse of 
risk shapes the way in 
which meanings related to 
risk are attached to objects 
Plans and protocols are an 
important way of preparing 
for risk incidents 
The (in)adequacy of plans 
and protocols can only be 
known during the real-time 
organizing of risk  
Risks can materialize in 
unanticipated ways which 
necessitate sensemaking and 
improvisation 
Organizing risk in real-time 
also occurs through 
continuous monitoring and 
adjustment of activities to 
keep them within tolerable 
limits  
Public inquiries serve 
multiple purposes in 
addition to official 
objectives of improving the 
future organizing of risk, 
including restoring 
confidence, advancing 
political interests, and 
deflecting criticism  
Public inquiries can 
unintentionally amplify 
concerns about risk 
Auditing and safety reviews 
may help organizations to 
learn from errors 
The retrospective organizing 
of risk is prone to hindsight 
bias, blaming and failures 
of organizational learning 
Predominant 
practices  
Normalizing: using prevailing 
scientific methods, 
referencing extant research, 
invoking established experts, 
and encouraging action based 
on precedents 
Controlling: implementing 
predetermined plans and 
protocols, centralizing 
decision authority, 
responding rigidly, and taking 
deliberate, practiced action 
Blaming: adopting a limited 
scope of inquiry, framing 
problems to be solved 
narrowly, using linear cause-
effect thinking, and focusing 
on human error in need of 
correction 
Alternative 
practices   
Problematizing: questioning 
the ability of existing 
knowledge to identify certain 
risks, disputing putative 
‘facts’, challenging 
established experts, and 
promoting the need for new 
types of risk knowledge 
Improvising: deviating from 
predetermined plans and 
protocols, decentralizing or 
delegating decision authority, 
responding flexibly, and 
taking emergent, exceptional 
action 
Learning: adopting a broad 
scope of inquiry, framing 
problems to be solved widely, 
using systemic cause-effect 
thinking, and focusing on 




Assumes that an optimal risk 
culture will result in effective 
prospective organizing of 
risk; however, because of 
extreme contexts, it may be 
impossible to prevent risks 
from materializing  
Assumes that an optimal risk 
culture will result in effective 
real-time organizing of risk, 
even if the extreme context 
has prevented the risk being 
prospectively organized  
Assumes that an optimal risk 
culture will result in effective 
retrospective organizing of 
risk, i.e. organizational 
learning, and subsequent 
changes in how risk is 
organized in the future 
Risk work 
perspective 
The majority of studies 
examine risk work 
undertaken to construct risks 
in organizations i.e., during 
the prospective mode 
Some studies, particularly 
those involving efforts to 
manage emotions, examine 
risk work undertaken as risks 
materialize i.e., during the 
real-time mode  
Some studies, particularly 
those involving forensic use 
of artefacts, examine risk 
work undertaken after a risk 





Draws attention to translated 
risks that may be organized 
prospectively by different 
actors 
Draws attention to translated 
risks that may need to be 
organized in real-time by 
different actors 
Draws attention to translated 
risks that may need to be 





TABLE 2: Insights into Risk Transitions  






Transitions are more likely to 
be set in motion when there 
is a familiar, widely 
recognized trigger   
Transitions are more likely to 
be delayed or abandoned if 
triggers are unfamiliar, 
confusing or ambiguous  
Transitions are set in motion 
routinely when there is a 
shared understanding that 
certain features of an 
incident automatically 
trigger a review or inquiry 
Transitions can also be set in 
motion exceptionally when 
triggers are debated and 
(re-) constructed after the 
incident  
It is not clear what particular 
triggers set this transition in 
motion or whether and how 
retrospection leads to action  









If the same actors are 
involved in the two modes, 
they may find it difficult to 
switch to radically different 
practices, thus delaying or 
preventing the transition 
If different actors are 
involved in the two modes, 
conflicts of interest may 
delay or prevent the 
transition 
Different groups of actors are 
typically involved in the 
two modes 
The ability of actors who 
were not present at the 
incident to judge the 
actions of others who were, 
and to do so after the risk 
incident, is usually taken-
for-granted  
 
Independent actors (from 
inside or outside the 
organization) typically 
hand recommendations 
over to another set of actors 
inside the organization for 
implementation  
Abstract knowledge 
developed during the 
inquiry or review has to be 
embedded in organizational 
practices and processes  
What is the 









There are circumstances that 
may lead organizations to 
blur the demarcation 
between these two modes 
e.g., by organizing a proxy 
risk in real-time as a way to 
organize another, ‘high 
stakes’ risk prospectively 
The two modes are assumed 
to be clearly demarcated 
when in fact they may 
interpolate each other: what 
can be known after a risk 
incident is influenced by 
what data is compiled 
during it; and the past can 
be ‘rewritten’ afterwards to 
become the official account 
of the incident 
We do not know the 
circumstances that lead to 
radically different practices 
being implemented (i.e., a 
‘fresh start’) compared to 
the continuation of existing 
organizational practices and 
processes 
Why is the 
transition 
important? 
We need to know more about 
this transition because 
delayed or failed transitions 
can make it harder to 
organize risks that are 
beginning to materialize 
and/or worsen their adverse 
effects when they do 
materialize 
We need to know more about 
this transition because it 
determines whether and 
how a risk incident is 
investigated  
We need to know more about 
this transition because it is 
key to ensuring that new 
risk knowledge improves 






TABLE 3: Insights into Risk Tensions  
 Prospective Mode Real-time Mode Retrospective Mode 
Tension Normalizing/Problematizing Controlling/Improvising Blaming/Learning 
Why does the 
tension arise?  
Actors privilege existing risk 
knowledge and defer to 
experts 
Problematizing is often 
associated with risk 
politicization and risk 
denial 
Actors privilege existing risk 
knowledge embedded in 
plans and protocols, and 
defer to senior members of 
the hierarchy  
Improvising is often 
associated with challenges 
to prevailing notions of 
hierarchy 
Actors privilege new risk 
knowledge developed by 
post hoc, independent 
inquiries and defer to 
independent adjudicators 
Learning is often associated 
with radical, systemic 
change that threatens vested 
interests 
Why is the tension 
important?  
Normalizing practices 
predominate, even though 
problematizing may be 
needed to organize novel 
risks prospectively 
Controlling practices 
predominate, even though 
improvising may be 
needed to organize risks 
that materialize in 
unexpected ways  
Blaming practices 
predominate, even though 
learning may be needed to 
improve how risk is 
organized in the future 
Why is the existing 
literature limited? 
Realist approaches dominate 
research on this mode; 
studies take normalizing 
for granted; studies of 
problematizing are rare 
 
Studies of crises tend to 
emphasize controlling 
practices; when they do 
study improvising, they 
rarely explore associated 
hierarchical conflicts 
Studies of inquiries tend to 
focus on blaming practices 
and failures to learn; they 
rarely examine when and 
how learning practices are 
enacted 
What insights does 
research adopting 
the risk culture 
perspective 
provide? 
Studies provide examples of 
organizations that have 
been successful in 
preventing risks from 
materializing 
Studies show how certain 
organizations, such as 
HROs, are able to engage 
in both controlling and 
improvising 
Studies have contributed an 
understanding of how 
organizations have 
instituted processes to learn 
from risk incidents 
How can the risk 
work perspective 
help to shed light 
on the tension? 
It is capable of specifying 
practices that address the 
tension by focusing on 
actions and struggles of all 
actors – experts and non-
experts – to create and 
apply this knowledge as 
they identify and attend to 
specific risks  
It is agnostic about whether 
certainty associated with 
the prevailing, scientific 
risk knowledge or the 
uncertainty associated with 
challenges to existing risk 
knowledge can serve as a 
basis for organizing risk 
It takes material affordances 
into account 
It is capable of specifying 
practices that address the 
tension by focusing on 
actions and struggles of all 
actors – regardless of their 
position in the hierarchy – 
to draw on and mobilize 
different types of 
knowledge as risk 
incidents arise  
It is agnostic about whether 
pre-existing, codified 
knowledge or emergent, 
embodied/tacit knowledge 
can serve as a basis for 
organizing risk 
It takes material affordances 
into account 
It is capable of specifying the 
practices that address 
tension by focusing on 
actions and struggles of all 
actors – lay and expert, 
inside and outside the 
organization – to interpret 
risk incidents after the fact 
and revise (or not) how they 
organize risk  
It is agnostic about whether 
holistic, convergent 
accounts of risk incidents or 
local, partial and potentially 
contradictory accounts can 
serve as a basis for 
organizing risk 
It takes material affordances 






TABLE 4: Insights into Risk Translations 
 Organizational Risk Translations Individualizing Risk Translations 
What are the dynamics 
of risk translation? 
The meaning of a particular risk 
object is translated into categories 
of organizational risk  
The result is risk proliferation: the 
original risk object becomes 
associated with multiple risks 
affecting diverse organizations 
The meaning of a particular risk object 
is translated into categories of 
individual risk 
The result is risk individualization: the 
original risk object is shifted from an 





Intensification of the dominant 
discourse of risk 
 
Intensification of discourses such as 
flexibilization, privatization and 
responsibilization 
What are the 
implications for power 
relations? 
Organizational power to act on risk 
is increased 
Risk translation is performative in 
enabling organizations to take 
action on risk, since they typically 
have routines in place to deal with 
the organizational risks that they 
translate 
Individuals may be able to pressure 
organizations to take action by 
translating risks for them 
Organizational power over individuals 
in relation to risk is increased 
Risk translation is repressive in enabling 
organizations to gain power at the 
expense of individuals, and to reduce 
the likelihood of being held 
accountable for organizing risk 
Individuals become responsible for 
managing translated risks and subject 
to sanctions if they fail to do so  
What are the 
implications for the 
risk cycle? 
Organizations are more likely to 
engage with all modes in the risk 
cycle due to risk proliferation; and 
are more likely to have routines in 
place that enable them to do so 
Individuals are more likely to take over 
responsibility for the prospective and 
real-time organizing of risk; while the 
organization usually keeps control of 
the retrospective mode. 
Why is it important to 
study risk 
translations?  
Given that grand challenges are 
associated with complex, systemic 
risks, research on risk translation 
may provide a way to learn more 
about how to engender 
organizational action on 
significant risks facing society 
Given that risk is an important source of 
inequality in society, research on risk 
translation may provide a way to learn 
more about how to engender 
organizational action that addresses 
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prospective mode 
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time mode 
Literature relevant to the 
retrospective mode 
Risk analysis/perception 
Bromiley et al., 2015  
Fjeld et al., 2007  
Jarzabkowski et al., 2015  
Leiss, 1996 
Lundgren & McMakin, 2018  
Jagiello & Hills, 2018  
MacKenzie, 2005 
Mikes, 2009, 2011 
Miller, 2009 
Millo & MacKenzie, 2009  
NAS-NRC, 1983 
Power, 2009 
Sjöberg, 2006  
Slovic, 2016  
Society for Risk Analysis, 2018 
van Leeuwen & Vermeire, 2007  




Boholm & Corvellec, 2011 
Borraz, 2007  
Borraz et al., 2007  
Demortain, 2020 
Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011  
Jardine et al., 2007  
Leiss, 2001 
Renn & Schweizer, 2009  
van Asselt & Vos, 2008 
Young & Liston, 2010 
 
Risk construction/risk discourse  
Clarke & Short, 1993 
Corvellec, 2011  
Douglas, 1992 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982 
Gephart et al., 2009 
Hardy & Maguire, 2010, 2016, 2019 
Hilgartner, 1992 
Jasanoff, 1998 
Klinke & Renn, 2002 
Lupton, 2013a 
Maguire & Hardy, 2006, 2013 
Mairal, 2008 
Malenfant, 2009 
Nyberg & Wright, 2015 
Palermo et al., 2017 
Power, 2004; 2007,  
Scheytt et al., 2006 
Wissman-Weber & Levy, 2018 
Zinn, 2008 
Crises, disasters/accidents  
Alexander, 2005  
Ash & Smallman, 2008  
Beamish, 2019 
Dosdall & Nichelmann, 2019 
Gephart et al., 2019  
Hällgren et al., 2018  
Kaplan & Mikes, 2012 
Leveson et al., 2009 
Perin, 2005 
Perrow, 1984 
Perry & Lindell, 2003  
Power, 2016a 
Sauer, 2003  
Williams et al., 2017  
 
Risk/crisis sensemaking  
Macrae, 2007  
Macrae, 2014  
Maitlis & Christianson, 2014 
Weick, 1993; 2010 
Weick et al., 2005  
Whiteman & Cooper, 2011 
Winch & Maytorena, 2009  
 
Risk monitoring  
Corvellec, 2009 
Hall & Renuka, 2016  
Hood et al., 2001 
Jørgensen & Jordan, 2016  
Mikes, 2016  
Palermo, 2016  
Power, 2007 






Ainsworth & Hardy, 2012  
Birkland, 2009  
Boin, 2008  
Brown, 2004  
Burgess, 2011  
Cullen, 2000 
Elliott & McGuinness, 2002  
Gephart, 1993  
Hayes & Maslen, 2019  
Hilgartner, 2007 
Hopkins 2008 
Huber & Scheytt, 2019  
Hutter, 1992 
Newdick & Danbury, 2015 
Parker & Dekker, 2008  
Topal, 2009  
 
Organizational reviews 
Alves et al., 2019   
Catino & Patriotta, 2013  
Dechy et al., 2012  
Dekker, 2002  
Dekker, 2015  
Douglas, 1992 
Hood, 2002  
Kendra, 2007  
Luburic et al., 2015 
Lupton & Warren, 2018 
Madsen, 2009  
McArdle et al., 2003 
Palermo, 2016  
Power, 2009; 2019  
Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2012  
Ron, Lipshitz & Popper, 2006  
Rose, 2004  
Sauer, 2003 
Stoop & Dekker, 2012  
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